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Abstract. Smart contracts are computer programs that are executed
by a network of mutually distrusting agents, without the need of an ex-
ternal trusted authority. Smart contracts handle and transfer assets of
considerable value (in the form of crypto-currency like Bitcoin). Hence,
it is crucial that their implementation is bug-free. We identify the util-
ity (or expected payoff) of interacting with such smart contracts as the
basic and canonical quantitative property for such contracts. We present
a framework for such quantitative analysis of smart contracts. Such a
formal framework poses new and novel research challenges in program-
ming languages, as it requires modeling of game-theoretic aspects to ana-
lyze incentives for deviation from honest behavior and modeling utilities
which are not specified as standard temporal properties such as safety
and termination. While game-theoretic incentives have been analyzed in
the security community, their analysis has been restricted to the very spe-
cial case of stateless games. However, to analyze smart contracts, stateful
analysis is required as it must account for the different program states
of the protocol. Our main contributions are as follows: we present (i) a
simplified programming language for smart contracts; (ii) an automatic
translation of the programs to state-based games; (iii) an abstraction-
refinement approach to solve such games; and (iv) experimental results
on real-world-inspired smart contracts.
1 Introduction
In this work we present a quantitative stateful game-theoretic framework for
formal analysis of smart-contracts.
Smart contracts. Hundreds of crypto-currencies are in use today, and investments
in them are increasing steadily [22]. These currencies are not controlled by any
central authority like governments or banks, instead they are governed by the
blockchain protocol, which dictates the rules and determines the outcomes, e.g.,
the validity of money transactions and account balances. Blockchain was initially
used for peer-to-peer Bitcoin payments [43], but recently it is also used for run-
ning programs (called smart contracts). A smart contract is a program that runs
on the blockchain, which enforces its correct execution (i.e., that it is running as
originally programmed). This is done by encoding semantics in crypto-currency
transactions. For example, Bitcoin transaction scripts allow users to specify con-
ditions, or contracts, which the transactions must satisfy prior to acceptance.
Transaction scripts can encode many useful functions, such as validating that a
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payer owns a coin she is spending or enforcing rules for multi-party transactions.
The Ethereum crypto-currency [14] allows arbitrary stateful Turing-complete
conditions over the transactions which gives rise to smart contracts that can
implement a wide range of applications, such as financial instruments (e.g., fi-
nancial derivatives or wills) or autonomous governance applications (e.g., voting
systems). The protocols are globally specified and their implementation is de-
centralized. Therefore, there is no central authority and they are immutable.
Hence, the economic consequences of critical bugs in a smart contract cannot be
reverted.
Types of Bugs. There are two types of bugs with monetary consequences:
1. Coding errors. Similar to standard programs, bugs could arise from coding
mistakes. At one reported case [31], mistakenly replacing += operation with
=+ enabled loss of tokens that were backed by $800,000 of investment.
2. Dishonest interaction incentives. Smart contracts do not fully dictate the
behavior of participants. They only specify the outcome (e.g., penalty or
rewards) of the behaviors. Hence, a second source for bugs is the high level
interaction aspects that could give a participant unfair advantage and in-
centive for dishonest behavior. For example, a naive design of rock-paper-
scissors game [27] allows playing sequentially, rather then concurrently, and
gives advantage to the second player who can see the opponent’s move.
DAO attack: interaction of two types of bugs. Quite interestingly a coding bug
can incentivize dishonest behavior as in the famous DAO attack [48]. The De-
centralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) [37] is an Ethereum smart con-
tract [51]. The contract consists of investor-directed venture capital fund. On
June 17, 2016 an attacker exploited a bug in the contract to extract $80 mil-
lion [48]. Intuitively, the root cause was that the contract allowed users to first
get hold of their funds, and only then updated their balance records while a se-
mantic detail allowed the attacker to withdraw multiple times before the update.
Necessity of formal framework. Since bugs in smart contracts have direct eco-
nomic consequences and are irreversible, they have the same status as safety-
critical errors for programs and reactive systems and must be detected before
deployment. Moreover, smart contracts are deployed rapidly. There are over a
million smart contracts in Ethereum, holding over 15 billion dollars at the time
of writing [29]. It is impossible for security researchers to analyze all of them,
and lack of automated tools for programmers makes them error prone. Hence, a
formal analysis framework for smart contract bugs is of great importance.
Utility analysis. In verification of programs, specifying objectives is non-trivial
and a key goal is to consider specification-less verification, where basic proper-
ties are considered canonical. For example, termination is a basic property in
program analysis; and data-race freedom or serializability are basic properties
in concurrency. Given these properties, models are verified wrt them without
considering any other specification. For smart contracts, describing the correct
specification that prevents dishonest behavior is more challenging due to the
presence of game-like interactions. We propose to consider the expected user
utility (or payoff) that is guaranteed even in presence of adversarial behavior of
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other agents as a canonical property. Considering malicious adversaries is stan-
dard in game theory. For example, the expected utility of a fair lottery is 0. An
analysis reporting a different utility signifies a bug.
New research challenges. Coding bugs are detected by classic verification, pro-
gram analysis, and model checking tools [21,38]. However, a formal framework
for incentivization bugs presents a new research challenge for the programming
language community. Their analysis must overcome two obstacles: (a) the frame-
work will have to handle game-theoretic aspects to model interactions and incen-
tives for dishonest behavior; and (b) it will have to handle properties that cannot
be deduced from standard temporal properties such as safety or termination, but
require analysis of monetary gains (i.e., quantitative properties).
While game-theoretic incentives are widely analyzed by the security commu-
nity (e.g., see [11]), their analysis is typically restricted to the very special case
of one-shot games that do not consider different states of the program, and thus
the consequences of decisions on the next state of the program are ignored. In
addition their analysis is typically ad-hoc and stems from brainstorming and
special techniques. This could work when very few protocols existed (e.g., when
bitcoin first emerged) and deep thought was put into making them elegant and
analyzable. However, the fast deployment of smart contracts makes it crucial to
automate the process and make it accessible to programmers.
Our contribution. In this work we present a formal framework for quantitative
analysis of utilities in smart contracts. Our contributions are as follows:
1. We present a simplified (loop-free) programming language that allows game-
theoretic interactions. We show that many classical smart contracts can
be easily described in our language, and conversely, a smart contract pro-
grammed in our language can be easily translated to Solidity [28], which is
the most popular Ethereum smart contract language.
2. The underlying mathematical model for our language is stateful concurrent
games. We automatically translate programs in our language to such games.
3. The key challenge to analyze such game models automatically is to tackle the
state-space explosion. While several abstraction techniques have been con-
sidered for programs [45,34,12], they do not work for game-theoretic mod-
els with quantitative objectives. We present an approach based on interval-
abstraction for reducing the states, establish soundness of our abstraction,
and present a refinement process. This is our core technical contribution.
4. We present experimental results on several classic real-world smart contracts.
We show that our approach can handle contracts that otherwise give rise
to games with up to 1023 states. While special cases of concurrent games
(namely, turn-based games) have been studied in verification and reactive
synthesis, there are no practical methods to solve general concurrent quan-
titative games. To the the best of our knowledge, there are no tools to solve
quantitative concurrent games other than academic examples of few states,
and we present the first practical method to solve quantitative concurrent
games that scales to real-world smart contract analysis.
In summary, our contributions range from (i) modeling of smart contracts as
state-based games, to (ii) an abstraction-refinement approach to solve such
games, to (iii) experimental results on real-world smart contracts.
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Organization. We start with an overview of smart contracts in Section 2. Our
programming language is introduced in Section 3 along with implementations
of real-world contracts in this language. We then present state-based concur-
rent games and translation of contracts to games in Section 4. The abstraction-
refinement methodology for games is presented in Section 5 followed by experi-
mental results in Section 6. Section 7 presents a comparison with related work
and Section 8 concludes the paper with suggestions for future research.
2 Background on Ethereum smart contracts
2.1 Programmable smart contracts
Ethereum [14] is a decentralized virtual machine, which runs programs called
contracts. Contracts are written in a Turing-complete bytecode language, called
Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) bytecode [53]. A contract is invoked by calling
one of its functions, where each function is defined by a sequence of instructions.
The contract maintains a persistent internal state and can receive (transfer)
currency from (to) users and other contracts. Users send transactions to the
Ethereum network to invoke functions. Each transaction may contain input pa-
rameters for the contract and an associated monetary amount, possibly 0, which
is transferred from the user to the contract.
Upon receiving a transaction, the contract collects the money sent to it,
executes a function according to input parameters, and updates its internal state.
All transactions are recorded on a decentralized ledger, called blockchain. A
sequence of transactions that begins from the creation of the network uniquely
determines the state of each contract and balances of users and contracts. The
blockchain does not rely on a trusted central authority, rather, each transaction
is processed by a large network of mutually untrusted peers called miners. Users
constantly broadcast transactions to the network. Miners add transactions to
the blockchain via a proof-of-work consensus protocol [43].
We illustrate contracts by an example (Figure 1) which implements a contract
that rewards users who solve a satisfiability problem. Rather than programming
it directly as EVM bytecode, we use Solidity, a widely-used programming lan-
guage which compiles into EVM bytecode [28]. This contract has one variable
balance. Users can send money by calling deposit , and the balance is updated
according to the sent amount, which is specified by msg .value keyword. Users
submit a solution by calling submitSolution and giving values to input parame-
ters a, b, c and d . If the input is a valid solution, the user who called the function,
denoted by the keyword msg .sender , is rewarded by balance. We note that when
several users submit valid solutions, only the first user will be paid. Formally, if
two users A and B submit transactions tA and tB to the contract that invoke
submitSolution and have valid input parameters, then user A is paid if and only
if tA appears in the blockchain before tB .
Subtleties. In this work, for simplicity, we ignore some details in the underlying
protocol of Ethereum smart contract. We briefly describe these details below:
– Transaction fees. In exchange for including her transactions in the
blockchain, a user pays transaction fees to the miners, proportionally to the
execution time of her transaction. This fact could slightly affect the mone-
tary analysis of the user gain, but could also introduce bugs in a program,
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1 contract SAT {
2 uint balance;
3 function deposit () payable {
4 balance += msg.value;
5 }
6 function submitSolution( bool a, bool b, bool c, bool d ) {
7 if( (a || b || !c) && (!a || c || !d) {
8 msg.sender.send(balance );
9 balance = 0;
10 }
11 }}
Fig. 1: Smart contract that rewards users satisfying (a ∨ b ∨¬c) ∧ (¬a ∨ c∨¬d).
as there is a bound on execution time that cannot be exceeded. Hence, it
is possible that some functions could never be called, or even worse, a user
could actively give input parameters that would prevent other users from
invoking a certain function.
– Recursive invocation of contracts. A contract function could invoke a function
in another contract, which in turn can have a call to the original contract.
The underling Ethereum semantic in recursive invocation was the root cause
for the notorious DAO hack [25].
– Behavior of the miners. Previous works have suggested that smart contracts
could be implemented to encourage miners to deviate from their honest
behavior [50]. This could in theory introduce bugs into a contract, e.g., a
contract might give unfair advantage for a user who is a big miner.
2.2 Tokens and user utility
A user’s utility is determined by the Ether she spends and receives, but could
also be affected by the state of the contract. Most notably, smart contracts are
used to issue tokens, which can be viewed as a stake in a company or an organiza-
tion, in return to an Ether (or tokens) investment (see an example in Figure 2).
These tokens are transferable among users and are traded in exchanges in re-
turn to Ether, Bitcoin and Fiat money. At the time of writing, smart contracts
instantiate tokens worth billions of dollars [30]. Hence, gaining or losing tokens
has clear utility for the user. At a larger scope, user utility could also be affected
by more abstract storage changes. Some users would be willing to pay to have
a contract declare them as Kings of Ether [40], while others could gain from
registering their domain name in a smart contract storage [39]. In the examples
provided in this work we mainly focus on utility that arises from Ether, tokens
and the like. However, our approach is general and can model any form of utility
by introducing auxiliary utility variables and definitions.
1 contract Token {
2 mapping(address=>uint) balances;
3 function buy() payable {
4 balances[msg.sender] += msg.value;
5 }
6 function transfer( address to, uint amount ) {
7 if(balances[msg.sender]>=amount) {
8 balances[msg.sender] -= amount;
9 balances[to] += amount;
10 }}}
Fig. 2: Token contract example.
3 Programming Language for Smart Contracts
In this section we present our programming language for smart contracts
that supports concurrent interactions between parties. A party denotes an
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agent that decides to interact with the contract. A contract is a tuple C =
(N, I,M,R,X0, F, T ) where X := N ∪ I ∪M is a set of variables, R describes
the range of values that can be stored in each variable, X0 is the initial values
stored in variables, F is a list of functions and T describes for each function, the
time segment in which it can be invoked. We now formalize these concepts.
Variables. There are three distinct and disjoint types of variables in X:
– N contains “numeric” variables that can store a single integer.
– I contains “identification” (“id”) variables capable of pointing to a party in
the contract by her address or storingNull. The notion of ids is quite flexible
in our approach: The only dependence on ids is that they should be distinct
and an id should not act on behalf of another id. We simply use different
integers to denote distinct ids and assume that a “faking of identity” does
not happen. In Ethereum this is achieved by digital signatures.
– M is the set of “mapping” variables. Each m ∈M maps parties to integers.
Bounds and Initial values. The tuple R = (R,R) where R,R : N ∪ M → Z
represent lower and upper bounds for integer values that can be stored in a
variable. For example, if n ∈ N , then n can only store integers between R(n)
and R(n). Similarly, if m ∈ M is a mapping and i ∈ I stores an address to
a party in the contract, then m [i] can save integers between R(m) and R(m).
The function X0 : X → Z ∪ {Null} assigns an initial value to every variable.
The assigned value is an integer in case of numeric and mapping variables, i.e.,
a mapping variable maps everything to its initial value by default. Id variables
can either be initialized by Null or an id used by one of the parties.
Functions and Timing. The sequence F =< f1, f2, . . . , fn > is a list of functions
and T = (T , T ), where T , T : F → N. The function fi can only be invoked in
time-frame T (fi) =
[
T (fi), T (fi)
]
. The contract uses a global clock, for example
the current block number in the blockchain, to keep track of time.
Note that we consider a single contract, and interaction between multiple
contracts is a subject of future work.
3.1 Syntax
We provide a simple overview of our contract programming language. Our lan-
guage is syntactically similar to Solidity and a translation mechanism for differ-
ent aspects is discussed in Section 3.5. An example contract, modeling a game of
rock-paper-scissors, is given in Figure 3. Here, a party, called issuer has issued
the contract and taken the role of Alice. Any other party can join the contract
by registering as Bob and then playing rock-paper-scissors. To demonstrate our
language, we use a bidding mechanism. A more exact treatment of the syntax
using a formal grammar can be found in Appendix A.1.
Declaration of Variables. The program begins by declaring variables1, their type,
name, range and initial value. For example, Bids is a map variable that assigns
1 For simplicity, we demonstrate our method with global variables only. However, the
method is applicable to general variables as long as their ranges are well-defined at
each point of the program.
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(0) contract RPS {
map Bids[0, 100] = 0;
id Alice = issuer;
id Bob = null;
numeric played [0,1] = 0;
numeric AliceWon [0,1] = 0;
numeric BobWon [0,1] = 0;
numeric bid[0, 100] = 0;
numeric AlicesMove [0,3] = 0;
numeric BobsMove [0,3] = 0;
//0 denotes no choice ,
//1 rock , 2 paper ,
//3 scissors
(1) function registerBob [1,10]
(payable bid : caller) {
(2) if(Bob==null) {
(3) Bob = caller;
(4) Bids[Bob]=bid;
}
else{
(5) payout(caller , bid);
}
(6) }
(7) function play[11, 15]
(AlicesMove:Alice = 0,
BobsMove:Bob = 0,
payable Bids[Alice]: Alice){
(8) if(played ==1)
(9) return;
else
(10) played = 1;
(11) if(BobsMove ==0 and AlicesMove !=0)
(12) AliceWon = 1;
(13) else if(AlicesMove ==0 and BobsMove !=0)
(14) BobWon = 1;
(15) else if(AlicesMove ==0 and BobsMove ==0)
{
(16) AliceWon = 0;
(17) BobWon = 0;
}
(18) else if(AlicesMove == BobsMove +1 or
AlicesMove ==BobsMove -2)
(19) AliceWon = 1;
else
(20) BobWon = 1;
(21) }
(22) function getReward [16 ,20]() {
(23) if(caller ==Alice and AliceWon ==1
or caller ==Bob and BobWon ==1)
{
(24) payout(caller , Bids[Alice] + Bids[Bob ]);
(25) Bids[Alice] = 0;
(26) Bids[Bob] = 0;
}
(27) }
}
Fig. 3: A rock-paper-scissors contract.
a value between 0 and 100 to every id. This value is initially 0. Line numbers
(labels) are defined in Section 3.2 below and are not part of the syntax.
Declaration of Functions. After the variables, the functions are defined one-by-
one. Each function begins with the keyword function followed by its name and
the time interval in which it can be called by parties. Then comes a list of input
parameters. Each parameter is of the form variable : party which means
that the designated party can choose a value for that variable. The chosen value
is required to be in the range specified for that variable. The keyword caller
denotes the party that has invoked this function and payable signifies that the
party should not only decide a value, but must also pay the amount she decides.
For example, registerBob can be called in any time between 1 and 10 by any of
the parties. At each such invocation the party that has called this function must
pay some amount which will be saved in the variable bid. After the decisions
and payments are done, the contract proceeds with executing the function.
Types of Functions. There are essentially two types of functions, depending on
their parameters. One-party functions, such as registerBob and getReward
require parameters from caller only, while multi-party functions, such as play
ask several, potentially different, parties for input. In this case all parties provide
their input decisions and payments concurrently and without being aware of the
choices made by other parties, also a default value is specified for every decision
in case a relevant party does not take part.
Summary. Putting everything together, in the contract specified in Figure 3, any
party can claim the role of Bob between time 1 and time 10 by paying a bid
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to the contract, if the role is not already occupied. Then at time 11 one of the
parties calls play and both parties have until time 15 to decide which choice
(rock, paper, scissors or none) they want to make. Then the winner can call
getReward and collect her prize.
3.2 Semantics
In this section we present the details of the semantics. In our programming
language there are several key aspects which are non-standard in programming
languages, such as the notion of time progress, concurrency, and interactions of
several parties. Hence we present a detailed description of the semantics. We
start with the requirements.
Requirements. In order for a contract to be considered valid, other than following
the syntax rules, a few more requirements must be met, which are as follows:
– We assume that no division by zero or similar undefined behavior happens.
– To have a well-defined message passing, we also assume that no multi-party
function has an associated time interval intersecting that of another function.
– Finally, for each non-id variable v, it must hold that R(v) ≤ X0(v) ≤ R(v)
and similarly, for every function fi, we must have T (fi) < T (fi).
Overview of time progress. Initially, the time is 0. Let Ft be the set of functions
executable at time t, i.e., Ft = {fi ∈ F |t ∈ T (fi)}, then Ft is either empty
or contains one or more one-party functions or consists of a single multi-party
function. We consider the following cases:
– Ft empty. If Ft is empty, then nothing can happen until the clock ticks.
– Execution of one-party functions. If Ft contains one or more one-party func-
tions, then each of the parties can call any subset of these functions at time
t. If there are several calls at the same time, the contract might run them
in any order. While a function call is being executed, all parties are able to
see the full state of the contract, and can issue new calls. When there are
no more requests for function calls, the clock ticks and the time is increased
to t + 1. When a call is being executed and is at the beginning part of the
function, its caller can send messages or payments to the contract. Values
of these messages and payments will then be saved in designated variables
and the execution continues. If the caller fails to make a payment or specify
a value for a decision variable or if her specified values/payments are not in
the range of their corresponding variables, i.e. they are too small or too big,
the call gets canceled and the contract reverts any changes to variables due
to the call and continues as if this call had never happened.
– Execution of multi-party functions. If Ft contains a single multi-party func-
tion fi and t < T (fi), then any party can send messages and payments to
the contract to specify values for variables that are designated to be paid or
decided by her. These choices are hidden and cannot be observed by other
participants. She can also change her decisions as many times as she sees fit.
The clock ticks when there are no more valid requests for setting a value for
a variable or making a payment. This continues until we reach time T (fi). At
this time parties can no longer change their choices and the choices become
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visible to everyone. The contract proceeds with execution of the function.
If a party fails to make a payment/decision or if Null is asked to make a
payment or a decision, default behavior will be enforced. Default value for
payments is 0 and default behavior for other variables is defined as part of
the syntax. For example, in function play of Figure 3, if a party does not
choose, a default value of 0 is enforced and given the rest of this function,
this will lead to a definite loss.
Given the notion of time progress we proceed to formalize the notion of
“runs” of the contract. This requires the notion of labels, control-flow graphs,
valuations, and states, which we describe below.
Labels. Starting from 0, we give the contract, beginning and end points of every
function, and every command a label. The labels are given in order of appearance.
As an example, see the labels in parentheses in Figure 3.
Entry and Exit Labels. We denote the first (beginning point) label in a function
fi by i and its last (end point) label by i.
Control Flow Graphs (CFGs). We define the control flow graph CFGi of the
function fi in the standard manner, i.e. CFGi = (V,E), where there is a vertex
corresponding to every labeled entity inside fi. We do not distinguish an entity,
its label and its corresponding vertex. Each edge e ∈ E has a condition cond(e)
which is a boolean expression that must be true when traversing that edge. For
example, Figure 4 is an illustration of the control flow graph of function play in
our example contract. For a more formal treatment see Appendix A.2.
a1 : played==1
a2 : BobsMove==0 and AlicesMove!=0
a3 : AlicesMove==0 and BobsMove!=0
a4 : AlicesMove==0 and BobsMove==0
a5 : AlicesMove==BobsMove+1
or
AlicesMove==BobsMove-2
Fig. 4: Control Flow Graph of play() (left) and its edge conditions (right)
Valuations. A valuation is a function val, assigning a value to every variable.
Values for numeric variables must be integers in their range, values for identity
variables can be party ids or Null and a value assigned to a map variable m must
be a function val(m) such that for each identity i, we have R(m) ≤ val(m)(i) ≤
R(m). Given a valuation, we extend it to expressions containing mathematical
operations in the straight-forward manner.
States. A state of the contract is a tuple s = (t, b, l, val, c), where t is a time
stamp, b ∈ N ∪ {0} is the current balance of the contract, i.e., the total amount
of payment to the contract minus the total amount of payouts, l is a label (that
is being executed), val assigns values to variables and c ∈ P ∪{⊥}, is the caller of
the current function. c =⊥ corresponds to the case where the caller is undefined,
10 K. Chatterjee, A.K. Goharshady, Y. Velner
e.g., when no function is being executed. We use S to denote the set of all states
that can appear in a run of the contract as defined below.
Runs. A run ρ of the contract is a finite sequence {ρj = (tj , bj , lj , valj , cj)}rj=0
of states, starting from (0, 0, 0, X0,⊥), that follows all rules of the contract and
ends in a state with time-stamp tr > maxfi T (fi). These rules must be followed
when switching to a new state in a run:
– The clock can only tick when there are no valid pending requests for running
a one-party function or deciding or paying in multi-party functions.
– Transitions that happen when the contract is executing a function must
follow its control flow graph and update the valuation correctly.
– No variable can contain an out-of-bounds value. If an overflow or underflow
happens, the closest possible value will be saved. This rule also ensures that
the contract will not create new money, given that paying more than the
current balance of the contract results in an underflow.
– Each party can call any set of the functions at any time.
This definition is formalized in Appendix A.2.
Remark 1. Note that in our semantics each function body completes its execu-
tion in a single tick of the clock. However, ticks might contain more than one
function call and execution.
Run prefixes. We use H to mean the set of all prefixes of runs and denote the
last state in η ∈ H by end(η). A run prefix η′ is an extension of η if it can be
obtained by adding one state to the end of η.
Probability Distributions. Given a finite set X , a probability distribution on X
is a function δ : X → [0, 1] such that ∑x∈X δ(x) = 1. Given such a distribution,
its support, Supp(δ), is the set of all x ∈ X such that δ(x) > 0. We denote the
set of all probability distributions on X by ∆(X ).
Typically for programs it suffices to define runs for the semantics. However,
given that there are several parties in contracts, their semantics depends on the
possible choices of the parties. Hence we need to define policies for parties, and
such policies will define probability distribution over runs, which constitute the
semantics for contracts. To define policies we first define moves.
Moves. We use M for the set of all moves. The moves that can be taken by
parties in a contract can be summarized as follows:
– Calling a function fi, we denote this by call(fi).
– Making a payment whose amount, y is saved in x, we denote this by pay(x, y).
– Deciding the value of x to be y, we denote this by decide(x, y).
– Doing none of the above, we denote this by .
Permitted Moves. We define Pi : S →M, so that Pi(s) is the set of permitted
moves for the party with identity i if the contract is in state s = (t, b, l, val, pj).
It is formally defined as follows:
– If fk is a function that can be called at state s, then call(fk) ∈ Pi(s).
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– If l = q is the first label of a function fq and x is a variable that can be
decided by i at the beginning of the function fq, then decide(x, y) ∈ Pi(s) for
all permissible values of y. Similarly if x can be paid by i, pay(x, y) ∈ Pi(s).
–  ∈ Pi(s).
Policies and Randomized Policies. A policy pii for party i is a function pii : H →
A, such that for every η ∈ H, pii(η) ∈ Pi(end(η)). Intuitively, a policy is a way
of deciding what move to use next, given the current run prefix. A policy profile
pi = (pii) is a sequence assigning one policy to each party i. The policy profile pi
defines a unique run ρpi of the contract which is obtained when parties choose
their moves according to pi. A randomized policy ξi for party i is a function
ξi : H → ∆(M), such that Supp(ξi(s)) ⊆ Pi(s). A randomized policy assigns a
probability distribution over all possible moves for party i given the current run
prefix of the contract, then the party can follow it by choosing a move randomly
according to the distribution. We use Ξ to denote the set of all randomized policy
profiles, Ξi for randomized policies of i and Ξ−i to denote the set of randomized
policy profiles for all parties except i. A randomized policy profile ξ is a sequence
(ξi) assigning one randomized policy to each party. Each such randomized policy
profile induces a unique probability measure on the set of runs, which is denoted
as Probξ [·]. We denote the expectation measure associated to Probξ [·] by Eξ [·].
3.3 Objective function and values of contracts
As mentioned in the introduction we identify expected payoff as the canonical
property for contracts. The previous section defines expectation measure given
randomized policies as the basic semantics. Given the expected payoff, we define
values of contracts as the worst-case guaranteed payoff for a given party. We
formalize the notion of objective function (the payoff function).
Objective Function. An objective o for a party p is in one of the following forms:
– (p+−p−), where p+ is the total money received by party p from the contract
(by “payout” statements) and p− is the total money paid by p to the contract
(as “payable” parameters).
– An expression containing mathematical and logical operations (addition,
multiplication, subtraction, integer division, and, or, not) and variables cho-
sen from the set N ∪ {m [i] |m ∈ M, i ∈ I}. Here N is the set of numeric
variables, m[i]’s are the values that can be saved inside maps.2
– A sum of the previous two cases.
Informally, p is trying to choose her moves so as to maximize o.
Run Outcomes. Given a run ρ of the program and an objective o for party p,
the outcome κ(ρ, o, p) is the value of o computed using the valuation at end(ρ)
for all variables and accounting for payments in ρ to compute p+ and p−.
Contract Values. Since we consider worst-case guaranteed payoff, we consider
that there is an objective o for a single party p which she tries to maximize
2 We are also assuming, as in many programming languages, that True = 1 and
False = 0.
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and all other parties are adversaries who aim to minimize o. Formally, given a
contract C and an objective o for party p, we define the value of contract as:
V(C, o, p) := sup
ξp∈Ξp
inf
ξ−p∈Ξ−p
E(ξp,ξ−p) [κ(ρ, o, p)] ,
This corresponds to p trying to maximize the expected value of o and all other
parties maliciously colluding to minimize it. In other words, it provides the worst-
case guarantee for party p, irrespective of the behavior of the other parties, which
in the worst-case is adversarial to party p.
3.4 Examples
One contribution of our work is to present the simplified programming language,
and to show that this simple language can express several classical smart con-
tracts. To demonstrate the applicability, we present several examples of classical
smart contracts in this section. In each example, we present a contract and
a “buggy” implementation of the same contract that has a different value. In
Section 6 we show that our automated approach to analyze the contracts can
compute contract values with enough precision to differentiate between the cor-
rect and the buggy implementation. All of our examples are motivated from
well-known bugs that have happened in real life in Ethereum.
Rock-Paper-Scissors. Let our contract be the one specified in Figure 3 and
assume that we want to analyze it from the point of view of the issuer p. Also,
let the objective function be (p+ − p− + 10 · AliceWon) . Intuitively, this means
that winning the rock-paper-scissors game is considered to have an additional
value of 10, other than the spending and earnings. The idea behind this is similar
to the case with chess tournaments, in which players not only win a prize, but
can also use their wins to achieve better “ratings”, so winning has extra utility.
A common bug in writing rock-paper-scissors is allowing the parties to move
sequentially, rather than concurrently [27]. If parties can move sequentially and
the issuer moves after Bob, then she can ensure a utility of 10, i.e. her worst-case
expected reward is 10. However, in the correct implementation as in Figure 3,
the best strategy for both players is to bid 0 and then Alice can win the game
with probability 1/3 by choosing each of the three options with equal probability.
Hence, her worst-case expected reward is 10/3.
Auction. Consider an open auction, in which during a fixed time interval every-
one is allowed to bid for the good being sold and everyone can see others’ bids.
When the bidding period ends a winner emerges and every other participant can
get their money back. Let the variable HighestBid store the value of the highest
bid made at the auction. Then for a party p, one can define the objective as:
p+ − p− + (Winner==p)× HighestBid.
This is of course assuming that the good being sold is worth precisely as much as
the highest bid. A correctly written auction should return a value of 0 to every
participant, because those who lose the auction must get their money back and
the party that wins pays precisely the highest bid. The contract in Figure 5
(left) is an implementation of such an auction. However, it has a slight problem.
The function bid allows the winner to reduce her bid. This bug is fixed in the
contract on the right.
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contract BuggyAuction {
map Bids [0 ,1000] = 0;
numeric HighestBid [0 ,1000] = 0;
id Winner = null;
numeric bid [0 ,1000] = 0;
function bid[1,10]
(payable bid : caller) {
payout(caller , Bids[caller ]);
Bids[caller ]=bid;
if(bid >HighestBid)
{
HighestBid = bid;
Winner = caller;
}
}
function withdraw [11 ,20]()
{
if(caller != Winner)
{
payout(caller , Bids[caller ]);
Bids[caller ]=0;
}
}}
contract Auction {
map Bids [0 ,1000] = 0;
numeric HighestBid [0 ,1000] = 0;
id Winner = null;
numeric bid [0 ,1000] = 0;
function bid[1,10]
(payable bid : caller) {
if(bid <Bids[caller ])
return;
payout(caller , Bids[caller ]);
Bids[caller ]=bid;
if(bid >HighestBid)
{
HighestBid = bid;
Winner = caller;
}
}
function withdraw [11 ,20]()
{
if(caller != Winner)
{
payout(caller , Bids[caller ]);
Bids[caller ]=0;
}
}}
Fig. 5: A buggy auction contract (left) and its fixed version (right).
Three-Way Lottery. Consider a three-party lottery contract issued by p as in
Figure 6 (left). Note that division is considered to be integer division, discarding
the remainder. The other two players can sign up by buying tickets worth 1
unit each. Then each of the players is supposed to randomly and uniformly
choose a nonce. A combination of these nonces produces the winner with equal
probability for all three parties. If a person does not make a choice or pay the
fees, she will certainly lose the lottery. The rules are such that if the other two
parties choose the same nonce, which is supposed to happen with probability 13 ,
then the issuer wins. Otherwise the winner is chosen according to the parity of
sum of nonces. This gives everyone a winning probability of 13 if all sides play
uniformly at random. However, even if one of the sides refuses to play uniformly
at random, the resulting probabilities of winning stays the same because each
side’s probability of winning is independent of her own choice assuming that
others are playing randomly.
We assume that the issuer p has objective p+−p−. This is because the winner
can take other players’ money. In a bug-free contract we will expect the value
of this objective to be 0, given that winning has a probability of 13 . However,
the bug here is due to the fact that other parties can collude. For example, the
same person might register as both Alice and Bob and then opt for different
nonces. This will ensure that the issuer loses. The bug can be solved as in the
contract in Figure 6 (right). In that contract, one’s probability of winning is 13
if she honestly plays uniformly at random, no matter what other parties do.
Token Sale. Consider a contract that sells tokens modeling some aspect of
the real world, e.g. shares in a company. At first anyone can buy tokens at a
fixed price of 1 unit per token. However, there are a limited number of tokens
available and at most 1000 of them are meant to be sold. The tokens can then
be transferred between parties, which is the subject of our next example. For
now, Figure 7 (left) is an implementation of the selling phase. However, there is
a big problem here. The problem is that one can buy any number of tokens as
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contract BuggyLottery {
id issuer = p;
id Alice = null;
id Bob = null;
id Winner = null;
numeric deposit [0,1] = 0;
numeric AlicesChoice [0,3] = 0;
numeric BobsChoice [0,3] = 0;
numeric IssuersChoice [0,3] = 0;
numeric sum [0 ,9]=0;
function buyTicket [1 ,10]
(payable deposit:caller)
{
if(deposit !=1) return;
if(Alice ==null) Alice=caller;
else if(Bob==null) Bob=caller;
else payout(caller , deposit );
}
function play [11 ,20]
(AlicesChoice:Alice = 0,
BobsChoice:Bob = 0,
IssuersChoice:issuer = 0,
payable deposit:issuer)
{
if(AlicesChoice ==0 or BobsChoice ==0)
Winner = issuer;
else if(IssuersChoice ==0 or
deposit ==0)
Winner = Alice;
else if(AlicesChoice == BobsChoice)
Winner = issuer;
else
{
sum= AlicesChoice+BobsChoice
+ IssuersChoice;
if(sum /2*2== sum)
Winner = Alice;
else
Winner = Bob;
}
}
function withdraw [21 ,30]()
{
if(caller == Winner)
payout(caller , 3);
}}
contract Lottery {
id issuer = p;
id Alice = null;
id Bob = null;
id Winner = null;
numeric deposit [0,1] = 0;
numeric AlicesChoice [0,3] = 0;
numeric BobsChoice [0,3] = 0;
numeric IssuersChoice [0,3] = 0;
numeric sum [0 ,9]=0;
function buyTicket [1,10]
(payable deposit:caller)
{
if(deposit !=1) return;
if(Alice ==null) Alice=caller;
else if(Bob==null) Bob=caller;
else payout(caller , deposit );
}
function play [11 ,20]
(AlicesChoice:Alice = 0,
BobsChoice:Bob = 0,
IssuersChoice:issuer = 0,
payable deposit:issuer)
{
if(AlicesChoice ==0 or BobsChoice ==0)
Winner = issuer;
else if(IssuersChoice ==0 or
deposit ==0)
Winner = Alice;
else
{
sum = AlicesChoice + BobsChoice
+ IssuersChoice;
if(sum /3*3== sum)
Winner = Alice;
else if(sum /3*3==sum -1)
Winner = Bob;
else
Winner = issuer;
}
}
function withdraw [21 ,30]()
{
if(caller == Winner)
payout(caller , 3);
}}
Fig. 6: A buggy lottery contract (left) and its fixed version (right).
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long as there is at least one token remaining. For example, one might first buy
999 tokens and then buy another 1000. If we analyze the contract from the point
of view of a solo party p with objective balance[p], then it must be capped by
1000 in a bug-free contract, while the process described above leads to a value
of 1999. The fixed contract is in Figure 7 (right). This bug is inspired by a very
similar real-world bug described in [52].
Token Transfer. Consider the same bug-free token sale as in the previous
example, we now add a function for transferring tokens. An owner can choose
a recipient and an amount less than or equal to her balance and transfer that
many tokens to the recipient. Figure 8 (left) is an implementation of this concept.
Taking the same approach and objective as above, we expect a similar result.
However, there is again an important bug in this code. What happens if a party
transfers tokens to herself? She gets free extra tokens! This has been fixed in the
contract on the right. This example models a real-world bug as in [42].
contract BuggySale {
map balance [0 ,2000] = 0;
numeric remaining [0 ,2000] = 1000;
numeric payment [0 ,2000] = 0;
function buy[1,10]
(payable payment:caller)
{
if(remaining <=0){
payout(caller , payment );
return;
}
balance[caller] += payment;
remaining -= payment;
}}
contract Sale {
map balance [0 ,2000] = 0;
numeric remaining [0 ,2000] = 1000;
numeric payment [0 ,2000] = 0;
function buy[1,10]
(payable payment:caller)
{
if(remaining -payment <0){
payout(caller , payment );
return;
}
balance[caller] += payment;
remaining -= payment;
}}
Fig. 7: A buggy token sale (left) and its fixed version (right).
contract BuggyTransfer {
map balance [0 ,2000] = 0;
numeric remaining [0 ,2000] = 1000;
numeric payment [0 ,2000] = 0;
numeric amount [0 ,2000] = 0;
numeric fromBalance [0 ,2000] = 0;
numeric toBalance [0 ,2000] = 0;
id recipient = null;
function buy [1 ,10]...
function transfer [1 ,10](
recipient : caller
amount : caller) {
fromBalance = balance[caller ];
toBalance = balance[recipient ];
if(fromBalance <amount)
return;
fromBalance -= amount;
toBalance += amount;
balance[caller] = fromBalance;
balance[recipient] = toBalance;
}}
contract Transfer {
map balance [0 ,2000] = 0;
numeric remaining [0 ,2000] = 1000;
numeric payment [0 ,2000] = 0;
numeric amount [0 ,2000] = 0;
id recipient = null;
function buy [1 ,10]...
function transfer [1 ,10](
recipient : caller
amount : caller) {
if(balance[caller]<amount)
return;
balance[caller] -= amount;
balance[recipient] += amount;
}}
Fig. 8: A buggy transfer function (left) and its fixed version (right).
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3.5 Translation to Solidity
In this section we discuss the problem of translating contracts from our pro-
gramming language to Solidity, which is a widely-used language for program-
ming contracts in Ethereum. There are two aspects in our language that are not
automatically present in Solidity: (i) the global clock, and (ii) concurrent choices
and payments by participants. We describe the two aspects below:
– Translation of Timing and the Clock. The global clock can be modeled by
the number of blocks in the blockchain. Solidity code is able to reference the
blockchain. Given that a new block arrives roughly every 15 to 20 seconds,
number of blocks that have been added to blockchain since the inception of
the contract, or a constant multiple of it, can quantify passage of time.
– Translation of Concurrent Interactions. Concurrent choices and payments
can be implemented in Solidity using commitment schemes and digital sig-
natures, which are standard tools in cryptography and cryptocurrencies. All
parties first commit to their choice and then when they can no longer change
it, unmask it. Commitment schemes can be extended to payments by requir-
ing everyone to pay a fixed amount which is more than the value they are
committing to and then returning the excess amount after unmasking.
Hence contracts in our language can be automatically translated to Solidity.
4 Bounded Analysis and Games
Since smart contracts can be easily described in our programming language,
and programs in our programming language can be translated to Solidity, the
main aim to automatically compute values of contracts (i.e., compute guaranteed
payoff for parties). In this section, we introduce the bounded analysis problem
for our programming language framework, and present concurrent games which
is the underlying mathematical framework for the bounded analysis problem.
4.1 Bounded analysis
As is standard in verification, we consider the bounded analysis problem, where
the number of parties and the number of function calls are bounded. In standard
program analysis, bugs are often detected with a small number of processes, or a
small number of context switches between concurrent threads. In the context of
smart contracts, we analogously assume that the number of parties and function
calls are bounded.
Contracts with bounded number of parties and function calls. Formally, a contract
with bounded number of parties and function calls is as follows:
– Let C be a contract and k ∈ N, we define Ck as an equivalent contract that
can have at most k parties. This is achieved by letting P = {p1,p2, . . . ,pk}
be the set of all possible ids in the contract. The set P must contain all ids
that are in the program source, therefore k is at least the number of such ids.
Note that this does not restrict that ids are controlled by unique users, and
a real-life user can have several different ids. We only restrict the analysis to
bounded number of parties interacting with the smart contract.
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– To ensure runs are finite, number of function calls by each party is also
bounded. Specifically, each party can call each function at most once during
each time frame, i.e. between two consecutive ticks of the clock. This closely
resembles real-life contracts in which one’s ability to call many functions is
limited by the capacity of a block in the blockchain, given that the block
must save all messages. For a more rigorous treatment see Appendix A.2.
4.2 Concurrent Games
The programming language framework we consider has interacting agents that
act simultaneously, and we have the program state. We present the mathematical
framework of concurrent games, which are games played on finite state spaces
with concurrent interaction between the players.
Concurrent Game Structures. A concurrent two-player game structure is a tuple
G = (S, s0, A, Γ1, Γ2, δ), where S is a finite set of states, s0 ∈ S is the start state,
A is a finite set of actions, Γ1, Γ2 : S → 2A \ ∅ such that Γi assigns to each state
s ∈ S, a non-empty set Γi(s) ⊆ A of actions available to player i at s, and finally
δ : S ×A×A→ S is a transition function that assigns to every state s ∈ S and
action pair a1 ∈ Γ1(s), a2 ∈ Γ2(s) a successor state δ(s, a1, a2) ∈ S.
Plays and Histories. The game starts at state s0. At each state si ∈ S, player
1 chooses an action ai1 ∈ Γ1(si) and player 2 chooses an action ai2 ∈ Γ2(si).
The choices are made simultaneously and independently. The game subsequently
transitions to the new state si+1 = δ(si, a1, a2) and the same process continues.
This leads to an infinite sequence of tuples p =
(
si, a
i
1, a
i
2
)∞
i=0
which is called
a play of the game. We denote the set of all plays by P. Every finite prefix
p[..r] :=
(
(s0, a
0
1, a
0
2), (s1, a
1
1, a
1
2), . . . , (sr, a
r
1, a
r
2)
)
of a play is called a history and
the set of all histories is denoted by H . If h = p[..r] is a history, we denote the
last state appearing according to h, i.e. sr+1 = δ(sr, a
r
1, a
r
2), by last(h). We also
define p[..− 1] as the empty history.
Strategies and Mixed strategies. A strategy is a recipe that describes for a player
the action to play given the current game history. Formally, a strategy ϕi for
player i is a function ϕi : H → A, such that ϕi(h) ∈ Γi(last(h)). A pair
ϕ = (ϕ1,ϕ2) of strategies for the two players is called a strategy profile. Each
such ϕ induces a unique play. A mixed strategy σi :H → ∆(A) for player i given
the history of the game. Intuitively, such a strategy suggests a distribution of ac-
tions to player i at each step and then she plays one of them randomly according
to that distribution. Of course it must be the case that Supp(σi(h)) ⊆ Γi(last(h)).
A pair σ = (σ1, σ2) of mixed strategies for the two players is called a mixed strat-
egy profile. Note that mixed strategies generalize strategies with randomization.
Every mixed strategy profile σ = (σ1, σ2) induces a unique probability measure
on the set of plays, which is denoted as Probσ[·], and the associated expectation
measure is denoted by Eσ[·].
State and History Utilities. In a game structure G, a state utility function u for
player 1 is of the form u : S → R. Intuitively, this means that when the game
enters state s, player 1 receives a reward of u(s). State utilities can be extended
to history utilities. We define the utility of a history to be the sum of utilities
of all the states included in that history. Formally, if h =
(
si, a
i
1, a
i
2
)r
i=0
, then
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u(h) =
∑r
i=0 u(si). Given a play p ∈ P, we denote the utility of its prefix of
length L by uL(p).
Games. A game is a pair (G, u) where G is a game structure and u is a utility
function for player 1. We assume that player 1 is trying to maximize u, while
player 2’s goal is to minimize it.
Values. The L-step finite-horizon value of a game (G, u) is defined as
υL(G, u) := sup
σ1
inf
σ2
E(σ1,σ2) [uL(p)] , (1)
where σi iterates over all possible mixed strategies of player i. This models the
fact that player 1 is trying to maximize the utility in the first L steps of the run,
while player 2 is minimizing it. The values of games can be computed using the
value-iteration algorithm or dynamic programming, which is standard. A formal
treatment of the standard algorithms for games is presented in Appendix B.1.
Remark 2. Note that in (1), limiting player 2 to pure strategies does not change
the value of the game. Hence, we can assume that player 2 is an arbitrarily
powerful nondeterministic adversary and get the exact same results.
4.3 Translating contracts to games
The translation from bounded smart contracts to games is straightforward,
where the states of the concurrent game encodes the states of the contract. Cor-
respondences between objects in the contract and game are as follows: (a) moves
in contracts with actions in games; (b) run prefixes in contracts with histories
in games; (c) runs in contracts with plays in games; and (d) policies (resp., ran-
domized policies) in contracts with strategies (resp., mixed strategies) in games.
Note that since all runs of the bounded contract are finite and have a limited
length, we can apply finite horizon analysis to the resulting game, where L is the
maximal length of a run in the contract. This gives us the following theorem:
Theorem 1 (Correspondence). Given a bounded contract Ck for a party p
with objective o, a concurrent game can be constructed such that value of this
game, υL(G, u), is equal to the value of the bounded contract, V(Ck, o,p).
Details of the translation of smart contracts to games and proof of the the-
orem above is relegated to Appendix B.2.
Remark 3. Note that in standard programming languages where there is no in-
teraction the underlying mathematical models are graphs. In contrast, for the
smart contracts programming languages we consider there are game theoretic
interaction, and hence concurrent games on graphs are considered as the under-
lying mathematical model.
5 Abstraction for Quantitative Concurrent Games
Abstraction is a key technique to handle large-scale systems. In the previous
section we described that smart contracts can be translated to games, but due
to state-space explosion (since we allow integer variables), the resulting state
space of the game is huge. Hence, we need techniques for abstraction, as well
as refinement of abstraction, for concurrent games with quantitative utilities. In
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this section we present such abstraction refinement for quantitative concurrent
games, which is our main technical contribution in this paper. We prove sound-
ness of our approach and its completeness in the limit. Then, we introduce a
specific method of abstraction, called interval abstraction, which we apply to
the games obtained from contracts and show that soundness and refinement are
inherited from the general case. We also provide a heuristic for faster refining of
interval abstractions for games obtained from contracts.
5.1 Abstraction for quantitative concurrent games
Abstraction considers a partition of the state space, and reduces the number of
states by taking each partition set as a state. In case of transition systems (or
graphs) the standard technique is to consider existential (or universal) abstrac-
tion to define transitions between the partition sets. However, for game-theoretic
interactions such abstraction ideas are not enough. We now describe the key in-
tuition for abstraction in concurrent games with quantitative objectives and
formalize it. We also provide a simple example for illustration.
Abstraction idea and key intuition. In an abstraction the state space of the
game (G, u) is partitioned into several abstract states, where an abstract state
represents a set of states of the original game. Intuitively, an abstract state
represents a set of similar states of the original game. Given an abstraction our
goal is to define two games that can provide lower and upper bound on the value
of the original game. This leads to the concepts of lower and upper abstraction.
– Lower abstraction. The lower abstraction (G↓, u↓) represents a lower bound
on the value. Intuitively, the utility is assigned as minimal utility among
states in the partition, and when an action profile can lead to different ab-
stract states, then the adversary, i.e. player 2, chooses the transition.
– Upper abstraction. The upper abstraction (G↑, u↑) represents an upper
bound on the value. Intuitively, the utility is assigned as maximal utility
among states in the partition, and when an action profile can lead to differ-
ent abstract states, then player 1 is chooses between the possible states.
Informally, the lower abstraction gives more power to the adversary, player 2,
whereas the upper abstraction is favorable to player 1.
General abstraction for concurrent games. Given a game (G, u) consisting of a
game structure G = (S, s0, A, Γ1, Γ2, δ) and a utility function u, and a partition
Π of S, the lower and upper abstractions, (G↓ = (Sa, sa0, A
a, Γ ↓1 , Γ
↓
2 , δ
↓), u↓) and
(G↑ = (Sa, sa0, A
a, Γ ↑1 , Γ
↑
2 , δ
↑), u↑), of (G, u) with respect to Π are defined as:
– Sa = Π∪D, where D = Π×A×A is a set of dummy states for giving more
power to one of the players. Members of Sa are called abstracted states.
– The start state of G is in the start state of G↑ and G↓, i.e. s0 ∈ sa0 ∈ Π.
– Aa = A∪Π. Each action in abstracted games either corresponds to an action
in the original game or to a choice of the next state.
– If two states s1, s2 ∈ S, are in the same abstracted state sa ∈ Π, then they
must have the same set of available actions for both players, i.e. Γ1(s1) =
Γ1(s2) and Γ2(s1) = Γ2(s2). Moreover, s
a inherits these action sets. Formally,
Γ ↓1 (s
a) = Γ ↑1 (s
a) = Γ1(s1) = Γ1(s2) and Γ
↓
2 (s
a) = Γ ↑2 (s
a) = Γ2(s1) = Γ2(s2).
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– For all pi ∈ Π and a1 ∈ Γ ↓1 (pi) and a2 ∈ Γ ↓2 (pi), we have δ↓(pi, a1, a2) =
(pi, a1, a2) ∈ D. Similarly for a1 ∈ Γ ↑1 (pi) and a2 ∈ Γ ↑2 (pi), δ↑(pi, a1, a2) =
(pi, a1, a2) ∈ D. This means that all transitions from abstract states in Π go
to the corresponding dummy abstract state in D.
– If d = (pi, a1, a2) ∈ D is a dummy abstract state, then let Xd = {pi′ ∈
Π | ∃ s ∈ pi δ(s, a1, a2) ∈ pi′} be the set of all partition sets that can be
reached from pi by a1, a2 in G. Then in G
↓, Γ ↓1 (d) is a singleton, i.e., player 1
has no choice, and Γ ↓2 (d) = Xd, i.e., player 2 can choose which abstract
state is the next. Conversely, in G↑, Γ ↑2 (d) is a singleton and player 2 has no
choice, while Γ ↑1 (d) = Xd and player 1 chooses the next abstract state.
– In line with the previous point, δ↓(d, a1, a2) = a2 and δ↑(d, a1, a2) = a1 for
all d ∈ D and available actions a1 and a2.
– We have u↓(sa) = mins∈sa{u(s)} and u↑(sa) = maxs∈sa{u(s)}. The utility of
a non-dummy abstracted state inG↓, resp.G↑, is the minimal, resp. maximal,
utility among the normal states included in it. Also, for each dummy state
d ∈ D, we have u↓(d) = u↑(d) = 0.
Given a partition Π of S, either (i) there is no lower or upper abstraction cor-
responding to it because it puts states with different sets of available actions
together; or (ii) there is a unique lower and upper abstraction pair. Hence we
will refer to the unique abstracted pair of games by specifying Π only.
Remark 4. Dummy states are introduced for conceptual clarity in explaining the
ideas because in lower abstraction all choices are assigned to player 2 and upper
abstraction to player 1. However, in practice, there is no need to create them,
as the choices can be allowed to the respective players in the predecessor state.
Example. Figure 9 (left) shows a concurrent game with (G, u) with 4 states.
The utilities are denoted in red. The edges correspond to transitions in δ
and each edge is labeled with its corresponding action pair. Here A = {a,b},
Γ1(s0) = Γ2(s0) = Γ2(s1) = Γ1(s2) = Γ2(s2) = Γ2(s3) = A and Γ1(s1) =
Γ1(s3) = {a}. Given that action sets for s0 and s2 are equal, we can create
abstracted games using the partition Π = {pi0, pi1, pi2} where pi1 = {s0, s2} and
other sets are singletons. The resulting game structure is depicted in Figure 9
(center). Dummy states are shown by circles and whenever a play reaches a
dummy state in G↓, player 2 chooses which red edge should be taken. Con-
versely, in G↑ player 1 makes this choice. Also, u↑(pi0) = max{u(s0), u(s2)} =
10, u↓(pi0) = min{u(s0), u(s2)} = 0 and u↑(pi1)u↓(pi1) = u(s1) = 10, u↑(pi2) =
u↓(pi2) = u(s3) = 0. The final abstracted G↓ of the example above, without
dummy states, is given in Figure 9 (right).
5.2 Abstraction: soundness, refinement, and completeness in limit
For an abstraction we need to prove three key properties: (a) soundness, (b) re-
finement of the abstraction, and (c) completeness in the limit. The intuitive
description is as follows: (a) soundeness requires that the value of the games is
between the value of the lower and upper abstraction; (b) refinement requires
that if the partition is refined, then the values of lower and upper abstraction
becomes closer; and (c) completeness requires that if the partitions are refined
enough, then the value of the original game can be approximated. We present
and prove each of these results below.
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Fig. 9: An example concurrent game (left), abstraction process (center) and the
corresponding G↓ without dummy states (right).
Soundness. Soundness means that when we apply abstraction, value of the
original game must lie between values of the lower and upper abstractions. In-
tuitively, this means abstractions must provide us with some interval containing
the value of the game. We expect the value of (G↓, u↓) to be less than or equal
to the value of the original game because in (G↓, u↓), the utilities are less than in
(G, u) and player 2 has more power, given that she can choose which transition
to take. Conversely, we expect (G↑, u↑) to have a higher value than (G, u).
Formal requirement for Soundness. An abstraction of a game (G, u) leading to
abstraction pair (G↑, u↑), (G↓, u↓) is sound if for every L,
υ2L(G
↓, u↓) ≤ υL(G, u) ≤ υ2L(G↑, u↑).
The factor 2 in the inequalities above is due to the fact that each transition in
the original game is modeled by two transitions in abstracted games, one to a
dummy state and a second one out of that dummy state.
We now formally prove our soundness result. The main intuition in this proof
is that letting player 1 get the minimal reward in each partition set when she
reaches any state of the set, and allowing player 2 to choose the resulting state
among all possibilities cannot possibly be in player 1’s favor and increase her
utility. Similarly, doing the opposite thing by letting her get the maximal reward
and choose the transition cannot possibly decrease her utility.
Theorem 2 (Soundness). Given a game (G, u) and a partition Π of its state
space, if G↑ and G↓ exist, then the abstraction is sound, i.e. for all L, it is the
case that υ2L(G
↓, u↓) ≤ υL(G, u) ≤ υ2L(G↑, u↑).
Proof. We prove the first inequality, the second one can be done similarly.
For a mixed strategy σ↓1 for player 1 in G
↓, let v(σ↓1) := infσ↓2 E
(σ↓1 ,σ
↓
2 )[u↓2L(p)]
be the guaranteed value of the game if player 1 plays σ↓1 . We say that σ
↓
2 is a
best response to σ↓1 if playing σ
↓
1 , σ
↓
2 leads to a total utility of v(σ
↓
1). We define
v(σ1) and best responses in G analogously.
Let σ↓1 be a strategy for player 1 in G
↓, such that v(σ↓1) = supς↓1 v(ς
↓
1 ) =
υ2L(G
↓, u↓). Such a strategy exists because the set of all strategies for player 1
is compact and υ2L is continuous. Let σ1 be a strategy for player 1 in G that
follows σ↓1 , i.e. looks at the histories of G as histories of G
↓ and assigns to
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each history of G the action that σ↓1 assigns to the corresponding history of
G↓. Then, let σ2 be a best response to σ1 in G and σ
↓
2 a strategy in G
↓ that
follows σ2 against σ
↓
1 , i.e. chooses actions in non-dummy states in accordance
with actions chosen by σ2 and actions in dummy states in accordance with
transitions of the play of (σ1, σ2). Intuitively, σ
↓
2 is player 2’s best strategy if
she does not use her additional ability of choosing the next state in G↓. It is
evident by construction that E(σ
↓
1 ,σ
↓
2 )[u↓2L(p)] ≤ E(σ1,σ2)[uL(p)], because paths in
G↓ according to these strategies go through a sequence of partition sets that
correspond exactly to the sequence of states that are visited in G and the utility
of each such partition set is defined to be less than or equal to the utility of each
of its states. Therefore v(σ↓1) ≤ v(σ1), given that σ2 was a best response. This
means that υ2L(G
↓, u↓) = v(σ↓1) ≤ v(σ1) ≤ υL(G, u).
Refinement. We say that a partition Π2 is a refinement of a partition Π1,
and write Π2 v Π1, if every pi ∈ Π1 is a union of several pii’s in Π2, i.e. pi =⋃
i∈I pii and for all i ∈ I, pii ∈ Π2. Intuitively, this means that Π2 is obtained
by further subdividing the partition sets in Π1. It is easy to check that v is a
partial order over partitions. We expect that if Π2 v Π1, then the abstracted
games resulting from Π2 give a better approximation of the value of the original
game in comparison with abstracted games resulting from Π1. This is called the
refinement property.
Formal requirement for the Refinement Property. Two abstractions of a game
(G, u) using two partitions Π1,Π2, such that Π2 v Π1, and leading to abstracted
games (G↑i , u
↑
i ), (G
↓
i , u
↓
i ) corresponding to each Πi satisfy the refinement property
if for every L,
υ2L(G
↓
1, u
↓
1) ≤ υ2L(G↓2, u↓2) ≤ υ2L(G↑2, u↑2) ≤ υ2L(G↑1, u↑1).
We now prove that any two abstractions with Π2 v Π1 satisfy this property.
Theorem 3 (Refinement Property). Let Π2 v Π1 be two partitions of the
state space of a game (G, u), then the abstractions corresponding to Π1,Π2 satisfy
the refinement property.
Proof. Note that Π2 v Π1, so Π1 can itself be considered as a partition of Π2
and one can then define an abstracted pair of games (G↓↓2 , u
↓↓
2 ) and (G
↓↑
2 , u
↓↑
2 ) on
(G↓2, u
↓
2) with respect to Π1. Strategies and paths in G
↓↓
2 are in natural bijection
with strategies and paths in G↓1 and the bijection preserves utility. Therefore,
using the Soundness theorem above, we have υ2L(G
↓
1, u
↓
1) = υ4L(G
↓↓
2 , u
↓↓
2 ) ≤
υ2L(G
↓
2, u
↓
2). The other inequality is proven by a similar argument.
Completeness in the limit. We say that an abstraction is complete in the
limit, if by refining it enough the values of upper and lower abstractions get as
close together as desired. Equivalently, this means that if we want to approximate
the value of the original game within some predefined threshold of error, we can
do so by repeatedly refining the abstraction.
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Formal requirement for Completeness in the limit. Given a game (G, u), a fixed
finite-horizon L and an abstracted game pair corresponding to a partition Π1,
the abstraction is said to be complete in the limit, if for every  ≥ 0 there exists
Π2 v Π1, such that if (G↓2, u↓2), (G↑2, u↑2) are the abstracted games corresponding
to Π2, then υL(G
↑
2, u
↑
2)− υL(G↓2, u↓2) ≤ .
Theorem 4 (Completeness in the Limit). Every abstraction on a game
(G, u) using a partition Π is complete in the limit for every value of L.
Proof. Consider the unit partition Π∗ = {{s}|s ∈ S}, where S is the set of states
of G. For every partition Π, we have Π∗ v Π. On the other hand, the upper and
lower abstracted games of (G, u) with respect to Π∗ are simply the same game
as (G, u) except that each transition now first goes to a dummy state and then
comes out of it without any choice for any of the players. Therefore their values
are the same and equal to the value of (G, u).
5.3 Interval Abstraction
In this section, we turn our focus to games obtained from contracts and provide
a specific method of abstraction that can be applied to them.
Intuitive Overview. Let (G, u) be a concurrent game obtained from a contract
as in the Section 4.3. Then the states of G, other than the unique dummy
state, correspond to states of the contract Ck. Hence, they are of the form
s = (t, b, l, val, p), where t is the time, b the contract balance, l is a label, p is the
party calling the current function and val is a valuation. In an abstraction, one
cannot put states with different times or labels or callers together, because they
might have different moves and hence different action sets in the corresponding
game. The main idea in interval abstraction is to break the states according to
intervals over their balance and valuations. We can then refine the abstraction
by making the intervals smaller. We now formalize this concept.
Objects. Given a contract Ck, let O be the set of all objects that can have an
integral value in a state s of the contract. This consists of the contract balance,
numeric variables and m[p]’s where m is a map variable and p is a party. More
precisely, O = {B}∪N ∪{m[p]|m ∈M,p ∈ P} where B denotes the balance. For
an o ∈ O, the value assigned to o at state s is denoted by os.
Interval Partition. Let Ck be a contract and (G, u) its corresponding game. A
partition Π of the state space of G is called an interval partition if:
– The dummy state is put in a singleton set pid.
– Each pi ∈ Π except pid has associated values, tpi, lpi,ppi and for each o ∈ O,
opi, opi, such that:
pi = {s ∈ S|s = (tpi, b, lpi, val,ppi) and for all o ∈ O, opi ≤ so ≤ opi}.
Basically, each partition set includes states with the same time, label and
caller in which the value of every object o is in an interval [opi, opi].
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We call an abstraction using an interval partition, an interval abstraction.
Refinement Heuristic. We can start with big intervals and continually break them
into smaller ones to get refined abstractions and a finer approximation of the
game value. We use the following heuristic to choose which intervals to break:
Assume that the current abstracted pair of games are (G↓, u↓) and (G↑, u↑)
corresponding to an interval partition Π. Let d = (pid, a1, a2) be a dummy state
in G↑ and define the skewness of d as υ(G↑d, u
↑)−υ(G↓d, u↓). Intuitively, skewness
of d is a measure of how different the outcomes of the games G↑ and G↓ are,
from the point when they have reached d. Take a label l with maximal average
skewness among its corresponding dummy states and cut all non-unit intervals
of it in more parts to get a new partition Π′. Continue the same process until
the approximation is as precise as desired. Intuitively, it tries to refine parts of
the abstraction that show the most disparity between G↓ and G↑ with the aim
to bring their values closer. Our experiments show its effectiveness.
Soundness and Completeness in the limit. If we restrict our attention to interval
abstractions, soundness is inherited from general abstractions and completeness
in the limit holds because Π∗ is an interval partition. Therefore, using interval
abstractions is both sound and complete in the limit.
Interval Refinement. An interval partition Π′ is interval refinement of a given
interval partition Π if Π′ v Π. Refinement property is inherited from general
abstractions. This intuitively means that Π′ is obtained by breaking the intervals
in some sets of Π into smaller intervals.
Conclusion. We devised a sound abstraction-refinement method for approximat-
ing values of contracts. Our method is also complete in the limit. It begins by
converting the contract to a game, then applies interval abstraction to the re-
sulting game and repeatedly refines the abstraction using a heuristic until the
desired precision is reached.
6 Experimental Results
6.1 Implementation and Optimizations
The state-space of the games corresponding to the smart contracts is huge.
Hence the original game corresponding to the contract is computationally too
expensive to construct. Therefore, we do not first construct the game and then
apply abstraction, instead we first apply the interval abstraction, and construct
the lower and upper abstraction and compute values in them. We optimized
our implementation by removing dummy states and exploiting acyclicity using
backward-induction. Details of experiments are provided in Appendix C.
6.2 Experimental Results
In this section we present our experimental results (Table 1) for the five examples
mentioned in Section 3.4. In each of the examples, the original game is quite
large, and the size of the state space is calculated without creating them. In our
experimental results we show the abstracted game size, the refinement of games
to larger sizes, and how the lower and upper bound on the values change. We
used an Ubuntu machine with 3.2GHz Intel i7-5600U CPU and 12GB RAM.
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Rock-Paper-Scissors
Size Abstractions
> 2.5 · 1014
Correct Program Buggy Variant
states [l , u] time states [l , u] time
19440 [0.00 , 10.00] 367 25200 [0.00 , 10.00] 402
135945 [1.47 , 6.10] 2644
258345 [8.01 , 10.00] 4815
252450 [1.83 , 5.59] 3381
Auction
Size Abstractions
> 5.2 · 1014
Correct Program Buggy Variant
states [l , u] time states [l , u] time
3360 [0 , 1000] 68 2880 [0 , 1000] 38
22560 [0 , 282] 406 27360 [565 , 1000] 552
272160 [0 , 227] 4237 233280 [748 , 1000] 3780
Lottery
Size Abstractions
> 2.5 · 108
Correct Program Buggy Variant
states [l , u] time states [l , u] time
1539 [−1 , 1] 17 1701 [−1 , 1] 22
2457600 [0 , 0] 13839 2457600 [−1 , −1] 13244
Sale
Size Abstractions
> 4.6 · 1022
Correct Program Buggy Variant
states [l , u] time states [l , u] time
17010 [0 , 2000] 226 17010 [0 , 2000] 275
75762 [723 , 1472] 1241 81202 [1167 , 2000] 1733
131250 [792 , 1260] 2872 124178 [1741 , 2000] 2818
Transfer
Size Abstractions
> 1023
Correct Program Buggy Variant
states [l , u] time states [l , u] time
1040 [0 , 2000] 20 6561 [0 , 2000] 237
32880 [844 , 1793] 562
131520 [1716 , 2000] 3979
148311 [903 , 1352] 3740
Table 1: Experimental results for the contracts and their buggy counterparts.
l := υ(G↓, u↓) denotes the lower value and u := υ(G↑, u↑) is the upper value.
Running times are reported in seconds.
Interpretation of the experimental results. Our results demonstrate the effective-
ness of our approach in automatically approximating values of large games and
real-world smart contracts. Concretely, the following points are shown:
– Refinement Property. By repeatedly refining the abstractions, values of lower
and upper abstractions get closer at the expense of a larger state space.
– Distinguishing Correct and Buggy Programs. Values of the lower and upper
abstractions provide an approximation interval containing the contract value.
These intervals shrink with refinement until the intervals for correct and
buggy programs become disjoint and distinguishable.
– Bug Detection. One can anticipate a sensible value for the contract, and an
approximation interval not containing the value shows a bug. For example,
in token sale, the objective (number of tokens sold) is at most 1000, while
results show the buggy program has a value between 1741 and 2000.
– Quantification of Economic Consequences. Abstracted game values can also
be seen as a method to quantify and find limits to the economic gain or loss
of a party. For example, our results show that if the buggy auction contract
is deployed, a party can potentially gain no more than 1000 units from it.
7 Comparison with Related Work
Blockchain security analysis. The first security analysis of Bitcoin protocol was
done by Nakamoto [43] who showed resilience of the blockchain against double-
spending. A stateful analysis was done by Sapirshtein et al. [47] and by Som-
polinsky and Zohar [49] in which states of the blockchain were considered. It was
done using MDPs where only the attacker decides on her actions and the victim
follows a predefined protocol. Our paper is the first work that is using two-player
and concurrent games to analyze contracts and the first to use stateful analysis
on arbitrary smart contracts, rather than a specific protocol.
Smart contract security. Delmolino et al. [27] held a contract programming work-
shop and showed that even simple contracts can contain incentive misalignment
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bugs. Luu et al. [41] introduced a symbolic model checker with which they could
detect specific erroneous patterns. However the use of model checker cannot be
extended to game-theoretic analysis. Bhargavan et al. [8] translated solidity pro-
grams to F ∗ and then used standard verification tools to detect vulnerable code
patterns. See [6] for a survey of the known causes for Solidity bugs that result
in security vulnerabilities.
Games and verification. Abstraction for concurrent games has been considered
wrt qualitative temporal objectives [20,44,26,3]. Several works considered con-
current games with only deterministic (pure) strategies [35,36,26]. Concurrent
games with pure strategies are extremely restrictive and effectively similar to
turn-based games. The min-max theorem (determinacy) does not hold for them
even in special cases of one-shot games or games with qualitative objectives.
Quantitative analysis with games has also been considered [10,15,19]. How-
ever these approaches either consider games without concurrent interactions
or do not consider any abstraction-refinement. A quantitative abstraction-
refinement framework has been considered in [16]; however, there is no game-
theoretic interaction. Abstraction-refinement for games has also been considered
for counter-example guided control and planning [18,35]; however, these works
do not consider games with concurrent interaction, nor quantitative objectives.
Moreover, [18,35] start with a finite-state model without variables, and interval
abstraction is not applicable to these game-theoretic frameworks. In contrast,
our technical contribution is an abstraction-refinement approach for quantita-
tive games and its application to analysis of smart contracts. A recent work [17]
also considers quantitative games for analyzing attacks in cryptocurrencies, but
it focuses on long-term mean-payoff analysis, rather than finite-horizon analysis,
and is not able to automatically synthesize the games from the protocols.
Formal methods in security. There is a huge body of work on program analy-
sis for security; see [46,1] for survey. Formal methods are used to create safe
programming languages (e.g., [33,46]) and to define new logics that can express
security properties (e.g., [13,5,4]). They are also used to automatically verify
security and cryptographic protocols, e.g., [2,?] and [7] for a survey. However,
all of these works aimed to formalize qualitative properties such as privacy vio-
lation and information leakage. To the best of our knowledge, our framework is
the first attempt to use formal methods as a tool for reasoning about monetary
loses and identifying them as security errors.
Bounded model checking. Bounded Model Checking (BMC), was first proposed
by Biere et al. in 1999 [9]. The basic idea in BMC is to search for a counterex-
ample in executions whose length is bounded by some integer k. If no bug is
found then one increases k until either a bug is found, the problem becomes
intractable, or some pre-known upper bound is reached.
Interval abstraction. The first infinite abstract domain was introduced in [23].
This was later used to prove that infinite abstract domains can lead to effective
static analysis for a given programming language [24]. However, none of the
standard techniques is applicable to game analysis.
8 Conclusion
In this work we present a programming language for smart contracts, and an
abstraction-refinement approach for quantitative concurrent games to automat-
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ically analyze (i.e., compute worst-case guaranteed utilities of) such contracts.
This is the first time a quantitative stateful game-theoretic framework is studied
for formal analysis of smart contracts. There are several interesting directions
of future work. First, we present interval-based abstraction techniques for such
games, and whether different abstraction techniques can lead to more scalability
or other classes of contracts is an interesting direction of future work. Second,
since we consider worst-case guarantees, the games we obtain are two-player
zero-sum games. The extension to study multiplayer games and compute values
for rational agents is another interesting direction of future work. Finally, in this
work we do not consider interaction between smart contracts, and an extension
to encompass such study will be a subject of its own.
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A Appendix to Section 3: Contracts Programming
Language
A.1 Appendix to Section 3.1: Formal Syntax
The following grammar formally defines the syntax of our language, the non-
terminal “Contract” is considered to be the start symbol and non-terminals
and keywords are enclosed in quotation marks. We usually refrain from putting
unnecessary parentheses or braces in the examples, even though they are formally
part of this grammar. Also, ε denotes the empty string.
Contract→ ‘contract’ ContractName ‘{’ VariableList FunctionList ‘}’
VariableList → VariableDefinition | VariableList VariableDefinition
VariableDefinition→ NumericDefinition | MapDefinition | IdDefinition
NumericDefinition → ‘numeric’ NumericVariableName ‘’ Integer ‘,’
Integer ‘]’ ‘=’ Integer ‘;’
MapDefinition → ‘map’ MapVariableName ‘[’ Integer ‘,’ Integer ‘]’
‘=’ Integer ‘;’
IdDefinition → ‘id’ IdVariableName ‘=’ Integer ‘;’ | ‘id’ IdVari-
ableName ‘=’ ‘null’ ‘;’
FunctionList → Function | Function FunctionList
Function → OnePartyFunction | MultiPartyFunction
OnePartyFunction → FunctionHeader ‘(’ ParameterList ‘)’ ‘{’
CommandList ‘}’
MultiPartyFunction → FunctionHeader ‘(’ ConcurrentParamList ‘)’ ‘{’
CommandList‘}’
FunctionHeader → ‘function’ FunctionName ‘[’ Integer ‘,’ Integer ‘]’
ParameterList → ε | Parameter | ParameterList ‘,’ Parameter
Parameter → ‘payable’ VariablePartyPair | VariablePartyPair
VariablePartyPair → SingletonName ‘:’ ‘caller’ | SingletonName ‘:’ Id-
VariableName
SingletonName→ NumericVariableName | IdVariableName | MapVari-
ableName ‘[’ IdVariableName ‘]’
ConcurrentParamList → ConcurrentParam | ConcurrentParamList ‘,’
ConcurrentParam
ConcurrentParam → ConcurrentPay | ConcurrentDecision
ConcurrentPay → ‘payable’ SingletonName ‘:’ IdVariableName
ConcurrentDecision→ SingletonName ‘:’ IdVariableName ‘ = ’ Default-
Value
CommandList → Command | Command CommandList
Command → If | Assignment | Payout | ‘return’ ‘;’
If → IfWithElse | IfWithoutElse
IfWithElse → ‘if’ ‘(’ Bexpr ‘)’ ‘{’ CommandList ‘}’ ‘else’ ‘{’
CommandList ‘}’
IfWithoutElse → ‘if’ ‘(’ Bexpr ‘)’ ‘{’ CommandList ‘}’
Assignment → NumericVariableName ‘=’ Expr ‘;’ | MapVariable-
Name‘[’ IdVariableName ‘]’ ‘=’ Expr ‘;’ | IdVariableName ‘=’ IdVari-
ableName ‘;’ | IdVariableName ‘=’ ‘null’ ‘;’
Payout → ‘payout’ ‘(’ Party ‘,’ Expr ‘)’ ‘;’
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Party → ‘caller’ | IdVariableName | ‘null’
Bexpr → Literal | ‘(’ Bexpr ‘and’ Bexpr ‘)’ | ‘(’ Bexpr ‘or’
Bexpr ‘)’ | ‘not’ ‘(’ Bexpr ‘)’
Literal → Expr Cmp Expr | Party ‘==’ Party
Cmp → ‘¡’ | ‘¿’ | ‘¡=’ | ‘¿=’ | ‘==’ | ‘!=’
Expr→ NumericVariableName | MapVariableName ‘[’ IdVariableName
‘]’ | Integer | ‘(’ Expr Operation Expr ‘)’
Operation → ‘+’ | ‘-’ | ‘*’ | ‘/’
Note that “/” is considered to be integer division. Moreover, multi-party
functions are not allowed to use the keyword “caller” because it is ambiguous.
A.2 Appendix to Section 3.2: Formal Semantics
In order to define runs of programmed contracts, we first formally introduce the
notions of last sets and control flow graphs.
Last Sets For an entity e, according to the grammar above, we define the
set Last(e) to contain those labels that can potentially form its last part in an
execution. Formally, the last sets are defined by the following attribute grammar:
Function → OnePartyFunction | MultiPartyFunction
Last(Function) = Last(OnePartyFunction) | Last(MultiPartyFunction)
OnePartyFunction → FunctionHeader ‘(’ ParameterList ‘)’ ‘{’
CommandList ‘}’
Last(OnePartyFunction) = Last(CommandList)
MultiPartyFunction → FunctionHeader ‘(’ ConcurrentParamList
‘)’ ‘{’ CommandList‘}’
Last(MultiPartyFunction) = Last(CommandList)
CommandList0 → Command | Command CommandList1
Last(CommandList0) = Last(Command) | Last(CommandList1)
Command → If | Assignment | Payout | ‘return’ ‘;’
Last(Command) = Last(If) | { Label(Command) } | { Label(Command)
} | { Label(Command)}
If → IfWithElse | IfWithoutElse
Last(If) = Last(IfWithElse) | Last(IfWithoutElse)
IfWithElse → ‘if’ ‘(’ Bexpr ‘)’ ‘{’ CommandList0 ‘}’ ‘else’ ‘{’
CommandList1 ‘}’
Last(IfWithElse) = Last(CommandList0) ∪ Last(CommandList1)
IfWithoutElse → ‘if’ ‘(’ Bexpr ‘)’ ‘{’ CommandList ‘}’
Last(IfWithoutElse) = Last(CommandList) ∪ { Label(IfWithoutElse) }
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Control Flow Graphs Given a contract and a function fi, the respective
control flow graph CFGi = (V,E) is a directed graph in which V consists of all
the labels in fi and E consists of the following directed edges:
– Initial edges. If the first label in the CommandList of fi is l, then there is
an edge from i to l with no condition, i.e. with true condition.
– Return edges. If l is the label of a return statement, then there is only one
edge (l,i) with no condition and none of the following cases apply.
– Normal flow edges. For every label l of an Assignment or a Payout, if the
entity labeled l + 1 is in the same scope, i.e. if there are no closed braces
between the two, then there is an edge (l, l + 1) with no condition.
– Conditional flow edges. If l is a label for an “if” statement
• If l+ is the first label of fi after all parts of l, i.e. after its Comman-
dList(s), then there is an edge from every l′ in the last set(s) of the
CommandList(s) of l to l+. These edges have no conditions.
• If lt is the first label in first CommandList of l, then there is an edge
(l, lt) with condition equal to the Bexpr of l.
• Let lf be the first label in second CommandList of l, or if no such label
exists lf = l+. Then there is an edge (l, lf ) with condition equal to the
negation of the Bexpr of l.
– Final edges. If l ∈ last(fi), then there is an edge (l,i) with no condition.
Formal Definition of a Run A run ρ of the contract is a finite sequence
{ρj = (tj , bj , lj , valj , cj)}rj=0 of states that corresponds to an execution of the
contract. Formally, ρ is a run if the following conditions hold:
– Initial state. t0 = b0 = l0 = 0, val0 = X0 and c0 =⊥.
– Final state. ρr must be the only state in which the time stamp tr is greater
than all upper time limits T (fi) of functions fi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
– For every 0 ≤ j < r, ρj+1 must be obtained from ρj by one of the following
rules:
• Ticks of the clock. lj ∈ {0,1,2, . . . ,n} and ρj+1 = (tj +
1, bj , 0, valj ,⊥). Intuitively, this means that the clock can only tick when
no function is being executed and a tick of the clock switches the contract
to global scope, i.e. outside all functions.
• Execution of one-party functions. lj = 0, cj =⊥, fi is a one-party
function such that T (fi) ≤ tj ≤ T (fi), p is party and ρj+1 =
(tj , bj ,i, val, p). This models the case when no function is being run
and the party p calls function fi. In the bounded modeling case, in order
to avoid the same party running the same function at the same time
stamp more than once, we consider a function call as a tuple (tj , fi, p)
and require that the current function call is lexicographically later than
the previous one, if it exists. Formally, if ρj = (tj , bj ,k, val, pj) and
(tj , fi, p) is lexicographically later than (tj , fk, pj) then it is allowed to
have ρj+1 = (tj , bj ,i, val, p). In normal execution of the programs, this
ordering is not enforced.
• Execution of multi-party functions. lj = 0, cj =⊥, fi is a multi-party
function, tj = T (fi), and ρj+1 = (T (fi), bj ,i, valj , p) for some party p.
This models the execution of function fi when the time T (fi) is reached.
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• Transitions inside functions.
∗ First transitions in functions. If lj = i, let P ⊆ X be the set
of variables that are designated to be paid at the beginning of
fi, and similarly, define D as the set of variables that are decided
at the beginning of the function fi. Then it is allowed to have
ρj+1 = (tj , bj +
∑
x∈P valj+1(x), lj+1, valj+1, cj) if the edge (lj , lj+1)
is present in CFGi and its condition evaluates to true under valj
and for all variables x 6∈ P ∪ D, valj+1(x) = valj(x) and for all
x ∈ P,max{0, R(x)} ≤ valj+1(x) ≤ R(x). The latter condition is
because one cannot pay a negative amount.
∗ Program flow transitions. If lj is a label in fi and lj 6= i,
· if lj is the label of an Assignment of the form x = expr;, then
it is allowed have ρj+1 = (tj , bj , lj+1, valj+1, cj) if (lj , lj + 1) is
an edge of CFGi and for all variables y 6= x, valj+1(y) = valj(y)
and valj+1(x) = max{R(x),min{R(x), valj(expr)}}. This en-
sures that all variables remain in bounds. Intuitively, overflows
and underflows cause the variable to store its highest possible,
resp. lowest possible, value. Similarly, if lj is the label of an as-
signment to an id variable, then the valuation must remain the
same, except that the value of that id variable must be updated
accordingly.
· if lj is the label of an If statement, either with or without an else
part, then ρj+1 = (tj , bj , lj+1, valj , cj) is allowed only if (lj , lj+1)
is an edge of CFGi and its condition evaluates to true under valj
and cj .
· if lj is the label of a Payout statement of the form pay-
out x to p for some expression x and party p, defining ω =
min{bj ,max{0, valj(x)}}, it is allowed to have ρj+1 = (tj , bj −
ω, lj+1, valj , cj) if (lj , lj+1) is an edge of CFGi. This makes sure
that payouts are always nonnegative and do not exceed the cur-
rent balance of the contract.
· if lj is the label of a return statement and has an edge to l′ in
the control flow graph of the current function, then we can have
ρj+1 = (tj , bj , l
′, val, p).
B Appendix to Section 4: Bounded Analysis and Games
B.1 Appendix to Section 4.2: Computing Game Values
Notation. We use uL(σ1, σ2) to denote E(σ1,σ2) [uL(p)].
Best Responses. We say that σ2 is a best response to σ1 if uL(σ1, σ2) =
infς2 uL(σ1, ς2). It is easy to see that for each σ1 there exists a pure best re-
sponse, i.e. a best response that does not use randomization, because given σ1,
the utility of every σ2 is an affine combination of utilities of some pure strategies
for player 2.
Stateless Games. A stateless (matrix) game between two players is a tuple G =
(A1, A2, v) where Ai is the set of actions available to player i, and v : A1×A2 → R
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is a utility function. In a stateless game, a strategy for player i is simply a
member of Ai and a mixed strategy ςi for player i is a probability distribution
over Ai. As usual, the game is zero-sum, i.e., player 1 is trying to maximize the
utility and player 2 to minimize it. The value of a stateless game G is defined as
υ(G) := supς1 infς2 u(ς1, ς2) = infς2 supς1 u(ς1, ς2). It is well-known that the latter
equality , which is called determinacy theorem, holds and that game values for
stateless games can be computed efficiently by linear programming.
Let G = (S, s0, A, Γ1, Γ2, δ) and s ∈ S, then by Gs we mean the game struc-
ture G starting at state s, i.e. Gs = (S, s,A, Γ1, Γ2, δ). Of course G = Gs0 .
Local Games. Let (G, u) be a concurrent game and s ∈ S, then we denote by
G[s, t] = (A1, A2, v), the local stateless game at state s, when there are t more
steps left. We now formalize this. It must be the case that A1 = Γ1(s), A2 = Γ2(s)
and for every pair of actions (a1, a2) in A1 ×A2, if s′ is the successor state of s
with these actions, i.e. if δ(s, a1, a2) = s
′, then v(a1, a2) = u(s) + υt−1(Gs′ , u).
It is easy to check that by definition, υ(G[s, t]) = υt(Gs, u).
Value Iteration. The last equality above leads to a natural algorithm for comput-
ing game values. In order to compute υL(G, u), we compute υt(Gs, u) = υ(G[s, t])
for every state s ∈ S and t ≤ L. This algorithm is called value iteration [32] and
is illustrated as Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Value Iteration
1: procedure ValueIteration(G = (S, s0, A, Γ1, Γ2, δ), u, L)
2: for t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , L} do
3: for s ∈ S do
4: if t = 0 then
5: υt(Gs, u)← 0
6: else
7: Create local game G[s, t]
8: Compute υ(G[s, t]) by linear programming
9: υt(Gs, u)← υ(G[s, t])
10: return υL(Gs0)
Corollary. The determinacy theorem for stateless local games and value iteration
lead to the following determinacy theorem: For every concurrent game (G, u),
υL(G, u) = sup
σ1
inf
σ2
uL(σ1, σ2) = inf
σ2
sup
σ1
uL(σ1, σ2).
B.2 Appendix to Section 4.3: Translation of Contracts to Games
In this section we formally show how a bounded contract Ck can be converted
to a game and establish relationships and correspondences between the two.
Let C = (N, I,M,R,X0, F, T ) be a contract, Ck its bounded model with
k parties, and S the set of all states that can appear in runs of Ck. Also,
let p ∈ P be a party with an objective o. We construct a game (G =
(S ∪ {d}, s0, A, Γ1, Γ2, δ), u) corresponding to (Ck,p, o) as follows:
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– Each state of the game corresponds to a state of the contract, except for d
which is a dummy state used to control the end of the contract.
– s0 is the initial state of Ck, i.e. s0 = (0, 0, 0, X0,⊥). This is the state from
which all runs of Ck begin.
– Player 1 of the game corresponds to the party p and player 2 corresponds
to all other parties colluding together.
– Each action of the game corresponds to either a single move in the contract
or a tuple of k − 1 moves, i.e. A = M∪Mk−1. Player 1 actions are only
single-move, to model moves by p, and player 2 actions are tuples of k − 1
moves, to model the joint action of the k − 1 other parties.
– At each state s ∈ S, Γ1(s) = Pp(s). Intuitively, this means that the actions
available to player 1 at state s of the game correspond to permitted moves
of p in state s of the contract.
– Similarly, at each state s ∈ S, Γ2(s) =
∏
p′∈P\{p} Pp′(s), i.e., each action of
player 2 at state s of the game corresponds to a joint action of all parties
other than p in state s of the contract.
– Γ1(d) = Γ2(d) = {}.
– δ follows the rules of the contract. More precisely, if in an execution of the
contract at state s, party p chooses the permitted move mp ∈ Pp(s) and
other parties, p′1,p
′
2, . . . ,p
′
k−1 choose permitted moves m
′
1,m
′
2, . . . ,m
′
k−1,
respectively, and the execution continues with the new state s′, then in the
game, we define δ(s,mp, (m
′
1,m
′
2, . . . ,m
′
k−1)) = s
′. Moreover, if s is the last
state of a run of Ck, then δ(s,mp, (m
′
1,m
′
2, . . . ,m
′
k−1)) = d and δ(d,,) =
d.
– u mimics o, i.e. for every state s:
• If s is the last state of a run of Ck and o’s expression part, i.e. the part
other than (p+ − p−), evaluates to x under the valuation at s, then in
the game we have u(s) = x.
• If o has a (p+−p−) part and the label in s points to a payout statement
of the contract that pays a value of x under s’s valuation to p, then
u(s) = x.
• If o has a (p+−p−) part and s is a successor of a payment/decision in the
contract in which p has paid a total value of x under the corresponding
valuation, then u(s) = −x.
• If s satisfies several of the conditions above, then u(s) is the sum of
values defined in all those cases. If it satisfies none of them, u(s) = 0.
By simply following the definitions, it can be settled that (i) every policy
profile pi of Ck corresponds to a strategy profile ϕ in G, in which player 1 acts
in correspondence with the moves of p and player 2 acts in correspondence
with the joint moves of other parties, (ii) every randomized policy ξp in the
contract corresponds naturally to a mixed strategy for player 1 in the game and
vice-versa, (iii) every randomized policy profile for parties other than p in the
contract corresponds to a mixed strategy for player 2 in the game, in which
actions are distributed according to the distributions for other parties’ moves.
However, this correspondence is not surjective, given that different components
in a mixed strategy for player 2 need not be independently distributed, and (iv)
The outcome of a policy profile, resp. randomized policy profile, in Ck is equal
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to the utility of its corresponding strategy profile, resp. mixed strategy profile,
in the game.
Note that these results hold only if our finite horizon L is big enough to model
all the runs as plays of the game. This can be achieved by letting L be at least
as big as the length of the longest run, which according to our semantics is no
more than |P| × t× l, where P is the set of parties, l is the number of labels and
t is the largest time in the contract. If L is greater than the length of a run, then
that run corresponds to a play of the game that reaches the dummy state d and
stays there.
Theorem 5 (Correspondence). If (G, u) is the game corresponding to the
bounded contract Ck for a party p with objective o, then the value of the game,
υ(G, u) is equal to the value of the bounded contract, V(Ck, o,p).
Proof. Note that by definition
V(Ck, o,p) = sup
ξp∈Ξp
inf
ξ−p∈Ξ−p
κ(ξp, ξ−p, o,p),
where by κ(ξp, ξ−p, o,p) we mean the expected outcome when using (ξp, ξ−p).
Given that the set of all randomized policy profiles is compact and κ is a bounded
continuous function, there must exist a specific randomized policy profile β =
(βp,β−p) such that V(Ck, o,p) = κ(β, o,p). According to (iv), there exists a
mixed strategy profile σ = (σ1,σ2) in the game, such that κ(β, o,p) = u(σ).
We prove that σ2 is a best response to σ1 in (G, u). Let σ
′
2 be a pure best
response to σ1, then according to (i) and (ii), there exists a randomized policy
profile β′ = (βp,β′−p) such that κ(β
′, o,p) = u(σ1,σ′2), but by definition of β,
κ(β′, o,p) ≥ κ(β, o,p) so u(σ1,σ′2) ≥ u(σ) and hence σ2 is a best response to σ1.
So V(Ck, o,p) = κ(β, o,p) = infσ2 u(σ1, σ2) ≤ supσ1 infσ2 u(σ1, σ2) = υ(G, u).
We now prove the other side. A similar argument as in the previous case
shows that there must exist a mixed strategy profile σ = (σ1,σ2) such that
u(σ) = supσ1 infσ2 u(σ1, σ2) = υ(G, u), given that changing σ2 with any other
best response for σ1 does not change u(σ), wlog we can assume that σ2 is
a pure best response. Then, according to (1) and (2) above, there exists a
randomized policy profile β = (βp,β−p) such that u(σ) = κ(βp,β−p, o,p).
We claim that κ(βp,β−p, o,p) = infξ−p κ(βp, ξ−p, o,p), because otherwise one
can create a better response for σ1 than σ2 using the process explained
in the previous part. Therefore, υ(G, u) = u(σ) = infξ−p κ(βp, ξ−p, o,p) ≤
supξp infξ−p κ(ξp, ξ−p, o,p) = V(Ck, o,p).
C Appendix to Section 6: Details of Implementation and
Experimental Results
C.1 Appendix to Section 6.1: Implementation Optimizations
Besides the optimization of first applying the abstraction, and then obtaining the
games, we also apply other optimizations to solve the abstracted games faster.
They are as follows:
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– Dummy state removal. First as explained in Remark 4 the dummy states
of the abstraction are for conceptual clarity, and we do not construct them
explicitly as part of state space.
– Exploiting acyclic structure. While for general concurrent games with cycles
the standard procedure to obtain values is by value-iteration algorithm, we
exploit the structure of games obtained from contracts. Since time is an im-
portant aspect of the semantics of contracts, and is encoded as part of the
state space, the concurrent games obtained from contracts and their interval-
abstraction are acyclic. For acyclic games, instead of general value-iteration,
backward induction approach can be applied. The backward induction ap-
proach works for acyclic games, and it computes values bottom-up (accord-
ing to the topological sorting order), i.e., it computes value of a state of the
games only when the values of all successors are determined. Details of the
backward-induction is presented below.
The above optimizations ensure that we can solve the abstract games quite
efficiently to obtain their values.
C.2 Acyclic Game Structures and Backward Induction
In this section we provide an overview of acyclic game structures and the classic
backward induction algorithm.
Acyclic Game Structures. An acyclic concurrent game structure is a tuple G =
(S, s0, A, Γ1, Γ2, δ) where all the parts have the same meaning and definition as
in concurrent games, except that (i) Γi(s) is now allowed to be empty, i.e., it
is possible to have dead-end states in which at least one of the players has no
available actions and (ii) no state is reachable from itself using a non-empty
sequence of transitions of the game.
Plays. A play of an acyclic game structure G is a finite sequence of states and
valid action pairs starting from s0, where each state is the result of transitioning
from its previous state and action pair and the sequence ends in a dead-end.
Strategies and Mixed Strategies. A strategy ϕi for player i in an acyclic game
structure G is a function ϕi : H → A suggesting a valid action to player i
after each history of the game. However, given that in an acyclic concurrent
game the future unfolding of a play is not dependent on how the current state
was reached, we can restrict our focus to the set of memoryless strategies, i.e.,
strategies that only depend on the current state of the game and not the whole
history. A memoryless strategy is a function of the form ϕi : S → A. In the same
spirit, a memoryless mixed strategy for player i is a function σi : S → ∆(A), that
assigns a probability distribution over permitted actions of player i at each state.
A mixed strategy profile σ = (σ1, σ2) induces a unique probability distribution
Probσ [·] over the set of all runs. In the remainder of this section, all strategies
are considered to be memoryless.
Utilities. A utility function u for player 1 assigns a real utility u(s) to each state
s of the game. Utility of a play pi is defined as the sum of utilities of its states.
Quantitative Analysis of Smart Contracts 39
Game Value. Given an acyclic game structure G, together with a utility function
u, the value of the game (G, u) is defined as:
υ(G, u) = sup
σ1
inf
σ2
E(σ1,σ2) [u(pi)]
where σi iterates over the set of all mixed strategies of player i.
Local Games. Let (G, u) be an acyclic concurrent game and s ∈ S, then we
denote by G[s] = (A1, A2, v), the local stateless game at state s. It must be
the case that A1 = Γ1(s), A2 = Γ2(s) and for every pair of actions (a1, a2) in
A1×A2, if s′ is the successor state of s with these actions, i.e. if δ(s, a1, a2) = s′,
then v(a1, a2) = u(s)+υ(Gs′ , u). It is easy to check that by definition, υ(G[s]) =
υ(Gs, u).
Backward Induction. The last equality above leads to a natural algorithm for
computing game values. In order to compute υ(G, u), we compute υ(Gs, u) =
υ(G[s]) for every state s ∈ S. This algorithm is called backward induction and
is illustrated as Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Backward Induction
1: procedure BackwardInduction(G = (S, s0, A, Γ1, Γ2, δ), u)
2: Sort S in Topological Order
3: for s ∈ S do
4: if Γ1(s) = ∅ or Γ2(s) = ∅ then
5: υ(Gs, u)← u[s]
6: else
7: Create local game G[s]
8: Compute υ(G[s]) by linear programming
9: υ(Gs, u)← υ(G[s])
10: return υ(Gs0)
C.3 Appendix to Section 6.2: Modelling Details in Experiments
Rock-Paper-Scissors. For this contract, we consider the correct implementation
as in Figure 3 along with a classic buggy variant that allows sequential, instead of
simultaneous, interactions with the contract. We analyze the case where k = 2,
because rock-paper-scissors is essentially a two-player game and adding more
parties has no effect other than increasing the complexity. The contract is ana-
lyzed from the point-of-view of its issuer, Alice. Her utility is defined to be her
overall monetary payoff plus 10 units if she wins the game.
Auction. We consider the Auction contract and its buggy version as in Figure 5.
The analysis models utility of a party as her monetary gain (or loss) plus value
of the auctioned object if she wins the auction. In the buggy version, one can
reduce her bid freely. In this case analyzing the contract with only one party,
i.e., with k = 1, already detects the bug and leads to a value strictly greater
than 0, while a correct contract should always have an objective value of 0.
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Lottery. We consider a lottery contract, and its wrong implementation, as in
Figure 6 and analyze it from issuer’s viewpoint assuming that the only utility
is the monetary gain or loss that occurs during the contract. This example is
different from other examples because variables have quite small ranges and even
a single refinement step can find precise values. Hence, as shown in the results,
there is no need of further refinement.
Token sale. In the token sale example of Figure 7, we model utility as the total
number of sold tokens. In a bug-free system this should never become more than
the number of available tokens, which in this case is fixed to 1000. However, a
buggy implementation might lead to a higher payoff.
Token transfer. A similar analysis with the same objective function as in token
sale for a contract which supports both sale and transfer of tokens (Figure 8),
can detect a bug that creates extra tokens in some transfers. The bug is again
due to the fact that values are strictly greater than 1000.
